Empirical researchers studying the relationship between information and communication technology (ICT) and the internal structure of an organization faces two main challenges. First, it is difficult to construct a large scale longitudinal data set that contains the variables on both organizational structure and ICT use, and as a result, many of the current empirical studies rely on cross-sectional data or case studies of a narrowly-defined industry. Second, different types of ICT may affect the organizational structure in different ways, so that an aggregate measure of ICT such as the fraction of worker using new computer technology is unable to disentangle the different effects. In this paper, I study empirically how the allocation of decision rights between the managers and the workers can be affected by the use of database software and communication system in the organization. Similar to Bloom et al. (2009, NBER Working Paper 14975), I argue that database software and communication system can lower the cost of information acquisition and information transmission. Such cost reductions should affect the decision structure in different ways: when information acquisition cost is lower, workers should have more decision rights; and when communication cost is lower, managers should have more decision rights. I use the longitudinal workplace-level data from the Canadian Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) to test the above two predictions. The empirical results show evidence to support the predictions: when database software is used, the likelihood that workers have decision rights increases (by about 5.9%); when communication software is used, the likelihood decreases (by about 4.8%). These results are robust to alternative explanations that might affect the outcome variable, including incentive system, human resources management practice and competition. Besides, the results are robust to the potential endogeneity and reverse causality problems of the ICT use variable, which are controlled by the control function method.
Introduction
In recent years, there is a growing body of literature studying the impact of technology, especially information and computer technology (ICT), on workplace organization and other labor market outcomes.
Empirical studies in the literature find that technology (measured by such variables as the ICT capital stock or the number of workers using computers) is complementary with the adoptions of new organizational structures (e.g., Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt, 2002; Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001 ) and with the demand for skilled workers (e.g., Autor, Levy, and Murnane, 2003) .
However, as argued by Garicano (2000) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) , different types of ICT can affect the organizational structure in different ways. In particular, they examine two types of ICT: one type can lower the cost of communication within an organization, and another type can lower the cost of knowledge acquisition for the agents, and they show that these two types of ICT can have opposite effects on the organizational structure. Empirically, Bloom, Garicano, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2009) use an international firm-level data set and find that the use of network and intranet (which can lower the cost of communication) and the use of Enterprise Resource Planning system (which can lower the cost of knowledge acquisition) indeed have different effects on the organizational structure. Therefore, aggregate measures of ICT, either at the workplace level or at the industry level, are unable to disentangle the different effects of ICT. To understand empirically the workplace organization can be affected by the adoption of ICT, one then needs to have data on the use of different types of ICT in the organization as well as measures of the organizational outcomes. But it is difficult to construct such a data set, especially in a longitudinal context. Recent empirical studies are usually based on cross-sectional data with detailed information on both ICT and organizational structure (e.g., Bloom et al., 2009 ) or a combination of panel and cross-sectional data with aggregate measures of ICT and information on organizational structure (e.g., Bresnahan et al., 2002; Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001 ).
In this paper, I study how the allocation of decision rights between the managers and the workers can be affected by the use of database software and communication system in the organization. Similar to Bloom et al. (2009) , I argue that database software and communication system can lower the cost of information acquisition and information transmission. Such cost reductions should affect the decision structure in different ways: when information acquisition cost is lower, workers should have more decision rights; and when communication cost is lower, managers should have more decision rights. Empirically, I use the longitudinal workplace-level data from the Canadian Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) to test the above two predictions. WES contains longitudinal workplace-level and employee-level data which are linked together (i.e., a "linked employer-employee" data set). It contains detailed information about the decision structure of the organization (from the Workplace Survey), the use of different types of ICT within the organization (from the Employee Survey), and other workplace characteristics such as workforce composition, incentive systems, human resources management practices, and exposure to competition, etc. The survey spans from 1999 to 2006 and contains about 6,000 workplaces in each cross-section from different industries and provinces across Canada. In the regression analysis, the outcome variable measures whether the managers and/ or workers can have decision rights with − 1 − respect to planning of individual work, and the key explanatory variables are whether database software and communication system is used within the workplace. The empirical results show evidence to support the predictions: when database software is used, the likelihood that workers have decision rights increases (by about 5.9%); when communication software is used, the likelihood decreases (by about 4.8%). These results are robust to alternative explanations that might affect the outcome variable, including incentive system, human resources management practice and competition. Besides, the results are robust to the potential endogeneity and reverse causality problems of the ICT use variable, which are controlled by the control function method. This paper contributes to the growing empirical literature of organizational economics in that I use a longitudinal data set with detailed information on both the organizational structure and the use of different types of ICT in the workplace to examine how ICT affects workplace organization. My empirical results suggest that, after controlling for unobserved workplace and time effects and potential endogeneity problem on the ICT use variables, the allocation of decision rights between the managers and the workers in the organization can be affected in different ways by database software (which proxies for lower information acquisition cost) and by communication system (which proxies for lower communication costs).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I discuss the related literature. In Section 3 I develop two empirical hypotheses about how database software and communication system can affect the decision structure of an organization. In Section 4, I describe the data set and the variables for the empirical analysis, and in Section 5, I describe the econometric specification. The empirical results from the baseline regressions and several robustness checks are presented in Section 6. I conclude the paper in Section 7.
Related Literature
On the theoretical side, there are numerous studies on the optimal organizational structure and especially the costs and benefits of centralization versus decentralization. One strand of the literature analyzes the optimal allocation of decision authority between the principals and the agents. For example, Aghion and Tirole (1997) show that a principal having limited information may want to allocate the formal authority (i.e., the right to decide) to the agent so that the latter can have an incentive to acquire information; Dessein (2002) studies a situation in which the agent has superior information due to his proximity to the production line but the preferences of the principal and the agent are mis-aligned. In his model, delegation can utilize the agent's informational advantage at the expense of a loss due to preference bias. On the other hand, under centralization, such a cost can be avoided, but at the same time the principal has to make an uninformed decision about the uncertain environment. Thus, delegation is more likely when the bias is small relative to the principal's knowledge about the uncertain environment; Zábojník (2002) argues that when the agent is liquidity contrained, delegation may be optimal even if the principal has better information because it is less costly to motivate the agent to work. Another strand of the theoretical literature looks at the relationship between organizational structure and − 2 − the costs of information acquisition and communication. For example, Garicano (2000) shows that, in an organization with agents having a fixed time endowment, it is optimal for some agents to specialize in production in the bottom layer and others to specialize in problem-solving in the upper layers. He also shows that as the time costs of learning and communication change, the optimal set of knowledge acquired by each agent and the span of control will change. Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) argue that different types of ICT can lower the cost of communication and the cost of acquiring knowledge, and depending on whether or not the types of ICT that lower communication cost and knowledge acqusition cost are used, the organizational structure in terms of degree of centralization, workers' knowledge and wages can be very different.
As mentioned earlier, there are relatively few empirical studies in the literature due to the difficulty of collecting data, and many of the empirical studies rely on cross-sectional data or case studies of a narrowly-defined industry. For example, to study the relationship among the use of ICT, workplace organization, and new production innovation, Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002) use a panel of US firms with firm-level data ICT capital stock and other measures of production function inputs between 1987 and 1994, and a cross-section data set with firm-level organizational practices variables in 1995 and 1996. They find that the three factors are complementary, and firms which are more innovative have a higher demand for skilled workers; Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997) study the impact of the adoption of human resource management (HRM) practices on firm productivities using data from a sample of 36 homogeneous steel production lines in the US. Bloom et al. (2009) and a panel of technology data (collected by Harte-Hanks, a private company) to study the relationship between organizational structure and the adoption of different types of ICT. They find that the use of software that facilitates information acquisition is associated with more worker autonomy and a wider span of control.
Recent longitudinal studies in the literature include Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) , Baker and Hubbard (2003) and Rajan and Wulf (2006) . Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) use data from the British Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) and the French Relations Professionnelles et Négociations d'Enterprise (REPONSE) survey to study the relationship among organizational change, technological change and productivity. They find that the likelihood of organizational change is negatively related to relative wages but positively related to the state of technology in both countries; Using data from the US trucking industry between 1987 and 1997, Baker and Hubbard (2003) find that the use of on-board computers (OBCs) on trucks affects the ownership structure in the trucking industry; Rajan and Wulf (2006) study a panel data set of more than 300 large US firms between 1986 and 1998 which contains information on job description of top managers, reporting relationships and compensation structure. They report the trend that firm hierarchies have become flatter.
The papers that are closest to the current paper are Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) and Bloom et al. (2009) . While all three papers are empirical studies on workplace organization, the main difference between this paper and these two papers is the way the outcome variables are constructed. Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) 
Information and Communication Technology and Allocation of Decision Rights

Empirical Hypotheses
In this Section, I develop two empirical hypotheses about how the use of database software and communication system, through the reduction in the costs of information acquisition and communication, can affect the allocation of decision rights within an organization.
Under centralization, the managers can make the decision (say choose a project). Once the decision is made, the managers need to inform the workers of the chosen project so that the workers can implement. On the other hand, under decentralization, the workers can choose a project by themselves.
Two factors are relevant when the organization decides whether to let the managers or the workers have the decision rights. The first one is related to the information structure of the organization (e.g., Dessein, 2002) . When the managers and the workers have different information sets, it is better to allow whoever having superior information (in terms of generating higher profit) to make the decision. For example, if the managers have more information about which products sell, then allowing the managers to choose the production plan should be able to generate a higher expected profit, other things being equal. Therefore, such a difference in managers' and workers' information sets leads to different profits 1 The exact description for "delayering" in the REPONSE survey is "Raccourcissement de ligne hiérarchique, c'est-à-dire suppression d'un niveau hiérarchique intermédiaire." 2 In WIRS, the firm is asked whether "substantial changes in work organization or working practices not involving new plant, machinery or equipment" made during the last three years "directly affected the jobs or working practices of the manual workforce." The same question is also asked for nonmanual workers. 3 Nevertheless, Caroli and Van Reenen argue that the British OC variable should still be valid because they find that organizational change usually involves more responsibilities for the workers: 33% (46%) of the firms report that organizational change involves more responsibilities for manual (nonmanual) workers, while the percentages of firms reporting less responsibilities are only 6% (3%) respectively.
− 4 − under centralization and decentralization. Another factor is related to the (limited) time endowments of the managers and the workers (e.g., Garicano, 2000) . Since centralization requires the transmission of the decision from the managers to the workers, when it takes too much time for communication, there is not much time left for actual production. In other words, communication cost can also affect the centralization versus decentralization decision. Centralization is optimal when the managers can generate a higher profit relative to the extra communication cost involved, and vice versa. Therefore, the organization's decision rule is:
Decentralization is optimal ⇐⇒ Communication cost ≥ Profit generated by the managers − profit generated by the workers ICT can affect the allocation of decision rights between the managers and the workers in that it can lower the cost of acquiring information relevant to the organization or production and the cost of transmitting information between the managers and the workers . They can respectively be achieved through the use of database software (such as an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system) and communication system (such as email or intranet). 4 Their systems were fragmented which made it difficult for the management to track the inventory and to know which products were profitable.
Database software such as an ERP system can help solve the above problems because it can integrate different systems internally and externally. Updated information can be obtained very easily,
usually with a few clicks of bottons. For example, after the implementation of an ERP system, the management at Tektronix was able to obtain instant inventory level regardless of its location, and in one division, same day shipments were reported to have increased from 15% to 75% after implementation.
Therefore, when database software is in use, both the managers and the workers can obtain useful information more quickly. Of course, when the workers have better information than the managers at the outset (say, due to the workers' proximity to the production line, as in Dessein, 2002) , then the workers can always generate a higher profit when they are allowed to make the decision. 5 In this case, decentralization is always an optimal choice. On the other hand, when the managers have better information to start with, allowing the managers to make the decision can generate a higher expected profit, but at the same time centralization involves a communication cost. When database software is used, both the managers and the workers can obtain the same piece of information (say latest inventory level) and update their information sets. The difference between their information sets, and so the profits they can generate, will become smaller. When the loss of profit due to allowing the workers with less information 4 See the case study by Westerman and Cotteleer (1999) . 5 This result may change when the preferences of the managers and the workers are mis-aligned.
− 5 − to make the decision is smaller than the loss due to the communication cost involved in centralization, it is better for the organization to let the workers decide.
Hypothesis 1: Decentralization is more likely when database software is used.
On the other hand, it is much more intuitive to understand how the electronic communication system such as email or intranet can save the time cost of information transmission. In terms of decision making, when the managers have made a certain decision, it becomes much easier to send the instruction to the workers at the bottom to implement. For example, when the headquarters have decided the production plans for different plants, the manager only has to send an email to all plant managers telling them what and how much to produce, rather than faxing the instruction or making telephone calls to individual plant managers. Thus, it is more likely that the decision is made by the managers rather than the workers when communication cost is low.
Hypothesis 2: Centralization is more likely when communication system is used.
Note that the above two hypotheses can also be derived under the framework of Garicano (2000) .
See, for example, Section 3.1 in Bloom et al. (2009) for a two-level Garicano-type organization.
Alternative Explanations
Apart from information acquisition cost and communication cost, there are other possible mechanisms that can affect the decision structure in an organization.
One alternative mechanism is the incentive structure of the organization. As in Aghion and Tirole (1997) , delegation is sometimes optimal because the agents will have the incentive to acquire information for the principal. Thus, in a way delegation and incentive structure are complimentary: when the agents are provided with incentives (through bonus system and profit sharing plan, etc.), they may exert more efforts to acquire value information for production, so that it pays for the principal to delegate more decision rights to the agents.
Apart from incentive system, other similar human resources management (HRM) practices are found to affect workers' productivities. Such practices include information sharing (Kleiner and Bouillon, 1988) , training (Bartel, 1995) , or a combination of such practices (Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi, 1997) .
While productivity is not the outcome variable in my analysis, one may argue that productivity and decision authority are related. For example, when making a decision takes up production time, then the principal may want to make the decision for the agent when the latter is relatively more productive at production. Therefore, HRM practices may indirectly affect the decision structure.
The model in this paper looks at the internal structure of a single organization, and we have not considered the possible impact of competition in the product market. In the trade literature, there are studies arguing that increased competition in local and international product markets leads to skills upgrading of workers, as well as affects decision authority of workers. For example, Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2010) find that increased competition leads to more decentralization. It is because plant managers (the agent) are usually more familiar with local market conditions than the CEO (the principal). − 6 − As competition increases, the agent can respond more quickly and delegation enables them to make better use of their informational advantage.
To control for the above alternative explanations, I include measures of incentive system, HRM practices and competition in the regression analysis.
Data
Workplace and Employee Survey
In this paper, I use the data from the Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) for empirical analysis. WES, conducted by Statistics Canada, is a linked employer-employee data set and is longitudinal. 6 The data in WES are confidential and are housed in Statistics Canada's Research Data Centres (RDCs). 7 A 2-digit classification of 14 aggregated industries is available at the RDC. The 14 industries are: forestry, mining, oil, and gas extraction; labour intensive tertiary manufacturing; primary product manufacturing; secondary product manufacturing; capital intensive tertiary manufacturing; construction; transportation, warehousing, wholesale; communication and other utilities; retail trade and consumer services; finance and insurance; real estate, rental and leasing operations; business services; education and health services; and information and cultural industries. The classification is based on the aggregation of the 1997 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). The original NAICS classification codes are available only in the Statistics Canada Headoffice. 8 The size classification is: 1 to 19 employees; 20 to 99 employees; 100 to 499 employees; and 500 employees or more. 9 The geographical regions are Altantic, Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia.
− 7 −
Variables
Decision rights of the workers: From the Workplace Survey, one can observe whether different types of employees can normally make decisions over various activities. 10 In the empirical analysis, I focus on the decision of planning of individual work, which is directly related to the everyday work of the workers irrespective of the business nature of the workplace, 11 and I consider the following three cases: (a) only the workers can decide, (b) both the workers and the managers can decide, and (c) only the managers can decide. 12 More specifically, I define the following two variables: The first one is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 when the workers can make decisions either by themselves or jointly with the managers. The second one is a 3-level categorical variable, taking into consideration that workers who can make decision solely have more decision rights than those who make decisions jointly with the managers. 13 In both cases, a higher value means that the workers have more Use of database software and communication system: I use the Employee Survey to construct two dummy variables indicating whether database software and communication system is used in the work- 10 The information is obtained from Question 19 of the Workplace Survey, which is reproduced in the Data Appendix. The types of employees include "Non-managerial employees," "Work group," "Work supervisor," "Senior manager," "Individual or group outside workplace," and "Business owner"; and the decisions include planning of individual work, recruitment and choice of production technology, etc. 11 Other activities may be specific to certain types of workplaces. For example, recruitment or training decisions are usually made within the human resources department but not elsewhere. 12 For the purpose of defining the outcome variables, "Workers" are defined as "Non-managerial employees," or "Work group," and "managers" are defined as "Work supervisor," "Senior manager," or "Business owner." 13 The assignment of "0.5" to joint decision in DEC I DE is arbitrary. In the empirical exercise, I use an order Probit model to analyze this outcome variable. Therefore, only the ranking represented by the different categories matter but not the actual values assigned to each category.
− 8 − place. 14 In particular, I define: 
Other control variables:
The basic set of control variables includes the fraction of workers using new computer technology (denoted by T EC H which is similar to the "T EC H " variable defined in Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001 ; it is used to control for the aggregate level of technology in the workplace), 15 the logarithm of total number of employees (to control for the effect of workplace size), the fraction of nonmanagerial employees covered by collective bargaining agreements, i.e., the fraction of unionized workers (to control for the union effect). I also include other variables to control for the alternative channels that might affect the allocation of decision rights. These variables include: an index of incentive system implemented in the workplace, an index of organizational change, an index of work practice, an index of training, and the level of competition that the workplace faces. The index of incentive system is to 14 The information is based on Question 22(c) of the Employee Questionnaire. Examples of database software include Access, dBase, Oracle, and FoxPro. Examples of communication system include Compuserve, Netscape, Outlook, Email systems, and Internet. Note that in both cases, I do not observe which particular software is in use in the workplace. 15 I also try another aggregate technology measure: a dummy variable indicating whether there is new investment in computer technology (which is similar to the "TECH>0" variable in Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001 ). The main empirical results using this variable are similar.
− 9 − control for the potential impact of incentives (Aghion and Tirole, 1997) . The indices of organizational change, work practice and training are to control for the use of Human Resources Management practices in the workplace (Ichniowski et al. 1997) . The competition measure is to control for the product market competition that the workplace faces (Bloom et al., 2010) . Detail definitions of these variables are in the Data Appendix.
Sample Selection
I only use a subset of the full WES data set for regression analysis. The regression sample is chosen based on several sample selection criteria. only consider workplaces within which the work planning decision is made by either the workers or the managers (or both). In other words, I exclude cases in which the decision is made by someone external to the workplace, or is neither decided internally nor externally. This is to ensure that if the workers do not make the decisions, then the mangers do. Third, the workplaces have to have over 50% of sales from
Canadian markets. This is to ensure consistency with the number of competitors variable defined earlier.
Excluding observations with missing information, the regression sample consists of 12,328 workplaceyear observations. Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of the 3-level categorical variable of workers' decision rights (DEC I DE ) and other explanatory variables. 16 In almost half of the cases, the managers plan individual work for the workers and the workers have some decision rights and full decision rights in about 40% and about 14% of the cases respectively. On the other hand, ICT use is very common: database software is in use in over 80% of the cases, and communication system over 70%. Across time, the means of the three cases of DEC I DE remain basically at the same level as shown in Figure 1 (a). The two ICT variables, however, increase over time (Figure 1(b) and (c)). This is, at first glance, contrary to the finding in the literature that decentralization has become more prevalent in recent years (e.g. Rajan and Wulf, 2006) . 17 Nevertheless, such a pattern can be justified if the different types of ICT have different effects on organizational structure, and these effects cancel out in aggregate. As will be shown in the empirical results below, the effects of the two ICT variables are indeed opposite in direction and similar in magnitudes. Thus the stable trend of workers' decision rights is not surprising. Although there is not much variation in the outcome variable across time and ICT use is very common as shown in Table 1 , Figure 2 shows that the outcome variable and the ICT variable still a lot of variation across industries.
Summary Statistics
[ − 10 − One can see that workers decision rights variable is associated with the other variables in different ways.
In particular, it is positively related to the use of database software and negatively related to the use of communication system. This pattern is consistent with the empirical hypotheses discussed earlier.
[ Table 2 is about here.]
In Table 3 , I compare the means of the variables for workplaces with ICT and those without. Columns
(1) and (3) show the means of the variables for the workplaces that use database software and those that do not; and Columns (7) and (9) show the means of the variables for the workplaces that use communication system and those that do not. In both cases, when ICT is used, it is more likely that the workers have decision rights (the means of the cases "managers decide" and "workers and managers decide" are higher). As for other covariates, there are significant differences between the workplaces with and without ICT: workplaces with ICT then to (a) have more employees, (b) have a smaller fraction of unionized workers, (c) have more organizational changes, incentive system, innovative work practices, training, and (d) face more competition. From Columns (6) and (12) which report the p-values of the differences, one can see that almost all of these differences are statistically significant. Thus one may worry about whether the workplaces using ICT and those not are systematically different along certain dimensions.
If so, regression results will be biased without proper control of the endogeneity problem. This issue will be discussed in Section 6.3.
[ Table 3 is about here.]
Econometric Specification
The regression results of this paper are mainly based on the workers' decision rights dummy (DEC I DE ).
They key results go through when the 3-level categorical variable DEC I DE is used as the outcome variable. To examine the impact of ICT use on workers' decision rights, I estimate the following workplacelevel panel data Probit regression: 18 For each variable x, the de-meaned value for workplace i in year t is given by x i t − (x i 1 + . . . + x i T )/T where T is the total number of cross-sections. 19 When DEC I DE is used as the dependent variable, one can specify a panel data ordered Probit model.
− 11 −
As is well-known in microeconometrics, the unobserved effects µ i in a non-linear model can neither be "differenced" nor be estimated as parameters (the "incidental parameters problem"). To estimate (5.1), additional identifying assumptions are needed (see Wooldridge, 2002) . Denote y i t as the outcome variable, x i t as the explanatory variables including the unobserved time effects. Assume that x i t is strictly exogenous conditional on the unobserved workplace effects µ i :
and that µ i follows a Chamberlain-type (1980) conditional Normal distribution:
where x i is the time average of x i t . Under (5.2) and (5.3), the regression model in (5.1) can be re-written as:
where ψ a = ψ/ 1 + σ 2 a and so on. Since this regression does not depend on the unobserved workplace effects µ i , the parameters can be consistently estimated using a pooled Probit of the outcome variable on a constant, the explanatory variables and their time averages. Table 4 reports the baseline results using the workers' decision rights dummy (DEC I DE ) as the dependent variable and the Probit regression model specified in (5.1). In all specifications, the observations are weighted by the sampling weights, workplace and year unobserved effects are controlled for, and standard errors are clustered at the 2-digit industry level. I first use the aggregate ICT measure (T EC H ) and the two ICT dummies (D AT AB ASE and COM M ) individually as the key explanatory variable (in Columns (1) to (3) respectively). In Columns (4) to (6), I add the baseline controls (workplace size and fraction of unionized workers) to these regressions. In Column (7), I use the three ICT measures as the explanatory variables, and in Column (8), the baseline controls are added. Similar to Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) , the coefficient of the aggregate ICT measure is positively related to workers' decision rights in all these regressions. Besides, consistent with the empirical hypotheses, workers' decision rights are positively related to the use of database software, and are negatively related to the use communication system. Focusing on Column (8), the marginal effects, when other variables are evaluated at their mean values, are as follows: when database software is used, the likelihood that workers have decision rights increases by about 5.9%; when communication software is used, the likelihood decreases by about 
Empirical Results
Baseline Regression Results
Alternative Explanations
In Columns (9) to (14) of Table 4 , I include other covariates to control for organizational change, incentive system, work practice, provision of training, and competition respectively. As explained earlier, these variables are also likely to affect the outcome variable. It turns out that these variables are positively related to workers' decision rights. In the full specification in Column (14), the effects of incentive systems, innovative work practices and training are statistically significant. Note that the coefficients of D AT AB ASE and COM M have the signs and similar magnitudes as in the baseline regression (in Column (8)), but the coefficient of T EC H , while still being positive, becomes insignificant in the full specification.
Robustness Check: Endogeneity and Reverse Causality
One potential problem in the baseline specification is endogeneity, which occurs when a factor, not controlled for in the regression, affects both the outcome and the explanatory variables. For example, an administrative workplace such as an IT office systematically uses different types of software, and due to the nature of this workplace, the workers are also empowered with the authority to plan their own work. In this case, the coefficients of the ICT use dummies in the regression only captures the spurious relationship between ICT use and decision rights rather than a causal effect. Part of the endogeneity problem is due to some unobserved time-specific or workplace-specific factors. This problem can be addressed when a panel data set is available and the unobserved time and workplace effects are controlled for. In the regressions reported in Table 4 , the unobserved effects have been controlled for. Nevertheless, other time-varying factors may still exist and cause endogeneity. In other words, controlling for unobserved effects is still not sufficient. On the other hand, reverse causality may also exist when the choice of ICT use is made to accommodate certain decision structure in the workplace. For example, if the owner decides to make the decision at the top level and allocate less decision rights to the workers, then a communication system may be required to facilitate the transmission of orders from the top to the bottom. 20 The marginal effects are calculated by using the following approximation: linear probability model coefficients ≈ Probit regression coefficients divided by 2.5. See, for example, Wooldridge (2002, p. 466) . − 13 −
The common approach to tackle the endogeneity and reverse causality problems is to find a set of instruments and estimate a two-stage least sqaures (2SLS) regression. However, the potential endogenous variables in the baseline regression are binary and the instruments may be weakly correlated with these endogenous variables so that the 2SLS results are unsatisfactory. Instead, I use the control function method (see, for example, Heckman and Navarro-Lozano, 2004) . The basic idea of the control function method is to add a function in the regression model to "control" for the correlation between the potential endogenous variables and the error term. This method can be implemented in two stages. In the first stage, I estimate the following Probit regressions that model the adoption of ICT: (6.2) where I N ST RU M E N T S i t contains the instruments (to be defined below) which do not appear in the baseline regression. From these Probit regressions, I obtain the propensity scores (i.e., the fitted probabilities). I then construct the control function, denoted by C F i t , as a polynomial of the propensity scores.
In the second stage, I estimate the baseline regression with the control function included:
Under the assumption that the unobserved factors (including those affecting the adoption of ICT and those specific to the different values of the outcome variable) are orthogonal to the instruments and other control variables, the control function C F i t will control for the correlation between the potential endogenous variables and the error terms.
The first instrument is a firm-level variable measuring the fraction of workers using computers at work, denoted by COM P _U SE R. 23 The higher the fraction of workers using computers, the more com- − 14 − partners. Specifically, for each industry j to which workplace i belongs, I compute the following index: (6.4) where I N PU T j j t is the percentage of input from industry j in year t required for each unit of output by industry j in year t , and SOF T W ARE j t is the value of software out of all types of equipment in industry j and year t . The higher the share of input from industry j is, the more business connection industry j has with industry j . Thus, I N DE X _SOF T W ARE j t should capture the average ICT use by the business partners of industry j to which workplace i belongs, and therefore one should expect that they be correlated with the use of database software and communication system in the workplace. I use data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis to construct the above index, because detailed industry level data are not readily available for public access in Canada. 24 Since the US and Canadian economies are very similar, the above US index should be a good approximation for the Canadian counterpart, and it is unlikely that this index is correlated with the unobserved component in the error term of the regression. Table 5 reports the first stage regression results of the control function method. In both regressions, the instruments are positively related to the ICT use variables, which is consistent with what one would expect. in the regression of D AT AB ASE , the coefficients of both instruments are significant, while in the regression of COM M , the coefficient of COM P _U SE R is significant but that for I N DE X _SOF T W ARE is not. Nevertheless, the coefficients are jointly significant in both regressions (with χ 2 -statistic of 33.97
and 54.59 respectively, and p-values less than 0.001 in both cases).
[ Table 5 is about here.]
From the two Probit regressions in Table 5 , I obtain the propensity scores and construct a polynomial of them as the control function. Table 6 reports the second stage results. Column (1) reports the basline results from the linear probability model (i.e., without the control function), and Columns (2) to (4) report the regression results when the control function is included: the control function in Column (2) is the first order polynomial of the propensity scores, and those for Columns (3) and (4) are the second and third order polynomials respectively. In all these cases, the coefficients of D AT AB ASE and COM M have the same signs as those in the baseline regression and are significant.
[ Table 6 is about here.] Table 7 reports a few other robustness checks. In Column (1), I use the 3-level categorical variable of workers' decision rights (DEC I DE ) as the dependent variable and run a panel data ordered Probit model. In the other specifications, I continue to use the original workers' decision rights dummy 24 To construct the I N PU T j j t variable, data from the "input-output table" are required, which are obtained from the "Industry-by-Industry Total Requirements after Redefinitions" tables at http://www.bea.gov/industry/iotables/. Data for industry-level use of ICT are from "Detailed Data for Fixed Assets and Consumer Durable Goods: Non-residential Detailed Estimates" at http://www.bea.gov/national/FA2004/Details/Index.html.
Other Robustness Checks
− 15 − (DEC I DE ) as the dependent variable. In Column (2), I run a linear probability model. In Columns (3) to (5), I use the Probit specification with different subsamples: the sample for Column (3) excludes the not-for-profit workplaces, the sample for Column (4) excludes the small workplaces (with fewer than 20 employees), the sample for Column (5) includes only workplaces with more than 50% of sales from local or Canadian markets. In all the regressions, the patterns are similar to the one in the baseline regression and are statistically significant.
[ Table 7 is about here.]
Conclusion
Empirical researchers studying the relationship between information and communication technology (ICT) and the internal structure of an organization faces two main challenges. First, it is difficult to construct a large scale longitudinal data set that contains the variables on both organizational structure and ICT use, and as a result, many of the current empirical studies rely on cross-sectional data or case studies of a narrowly-defined industry. Second, different types of ICT may affect the organizational structure in different ways, so that an aggregate measure of ICT such as the fraction of worker using new computer technology is unable to disentangle the different effects.
In this paper, I study how the allocation of decision rights between the managers and the workers The empirical results show evidence to support the predictions: when database software is used, the likelihood that workers have decision rights increases (by about 5.9%); when communication software is used, the likelihood decreases (by about 4.8%). These results are robust to alternative explanations that might affect the outcome variable, including incentive system, human resources management practice and competition. Besides, the results are robust to the potential endogeneity and reverse causality problems of the ICT use variable, which are controlled by the control function method.
where the organizational changes include "greater integration among different functional areas," "downsizing," "decrease in the degree of centralization," "re-engineering," "adoption of flexible working hours," "implementation of total quality management," and "outsourcing," and β i 's are the PCA weights. The information is based on Question 20 of the Workplace Survey.
Work practice index: An index to indicate the innovative work practices implemented in the workplace:
where the work practices include "employee's suggestion program," "flexible job design," "information sharing with employees," "problem-solving teams," "joint labor-management committees," and "selfdirected work groups," and β i 's are the PCA weights. The information is based on Question 18 of the Workplace Survey. (01); labour intensive tertiary manufacturing (02); primary product manufacturing (03); secondary product manufacturing (04); capital intensive tertiary manufacturing (05); construction (06); transportation, warehousing, wholesale (07); communication and other utilities (08); retail trade and consumer services (09); finance and insurance (10); real estate, rental and leasing operations (11); business services (12); education and health services (13); and information and cultural industries (14). (1)
(8)
(1) DEC I DE (2) The following table compares the means and standard deviations of the variables for workplaces with and without ICT; All observations are weighted by the sampling weight.
(1)
(8) : significance at 5%; * * * : significance at 1%.
(10) (1) reports the results from the baseline regression (linear probability model); Columns (2) to (4) report the results from the control function regressions, in which 1st, 2nd and 3rd order polynomials of the propensity scores of the Probit regression in Table 5 are used as the control function; All observations are weighted by the sampling weight; Robust standard errors, clustered at the industry level, are in parentheses;
* : significance at 10%; * * : significance at 5%; * * * : significance at 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (1) is an ordered Probit regression; Column (2) is a linear regression; Columns (3) to (5) are Probit regressions: the sample for Column (3) excludes the not-for-profit workplaces, the sample for Column (4) excludes the small workplaces (with fewer than 20 employees), the sample for Column (5) includes only workplaces with more than 50% of sales from local or Canadian markets; All observations are weighted by the sampling weight; Robust standard errors, clustered at the industry level, are in parentheses;
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
